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A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries tend to 
grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts.  We attempt to explain this phenomenon 
by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with corrupt 
governments.  The presence or absence of political competition, as well as the potential 
costs of political transitions, turn out to be key elements in generating the ‘resource curse.’  
These variables define the degree of freedom that incumbent governments have in pursuing 
development policies that maximize surplus in the lobbying game, but put the economy off 
its optimal path.  We test our predictions by adding measures of democracy and 
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1. Introduction 
Conventional economic reasoning suggests that increasing a country’s stock of assets 
provides greater opportunities for economic development and should translate into more 
production.  A number of influential studies have recently cast doubt upon the validity of 
this axiom.  A substantial body of empirical evidence demonstrates an inverse relationship 
between natural resource endowments and economic growth, even when controlling for a 
wide variety of variables.  Assuming that the share of primary exports in GDP is a 
reasonable proxy for resource wealth,
1 it has been shown that countries that are well 
endowed with natural resources tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts 
(e.g., Sachs and Warner 1997, 2001; Auty 2001a).  To be precise; Sachs and Warner 
estimate that an increase of one standard deviation in natural resource intensity (on average 
16% of GNP) leads to a reduction of about 1 percent per year in economic growth. This 
phenomenon has been coined the resource curse hypothesis.   
Not surprisingly, this counterintuitive finding has motivated a vast and rapidly 
growing literature seeking to examine its robustness, and the precise conditions under 
which it obtains.  Theoretical explanations for the resource curse hypothesis now abound 
(see section 2). In this paper we focus on the key role played by corruption in linking 
resource abundance to economic growth – an angle that is appropriate in light of recent 
empirical work.  We formally model the interaction between agents from the private sector 
competing for favours from the government, but expand on earlier rent-seeking models by 
treating the government as an active player with its own objectives and constraints as well.  
We extend the existing literature by presenting a political-economy model that focuses on 
the effects of resource abundance on government decision-making, corruption and political 
                                                 
1 Gylfason (2001) employs another proxy for resource wealth (namely the ratio of natural capital to total 
capital—or the sum of natural, human, and physical capital), and finds that the qualitative results are 
unaffected.  Stijns (2002), on the other hand, employs yet another measure (physical reserves) and finds that 
the curse disappears for resources other than land.  We speculate that the econometrics of the curse will be an 
active area of research in the near future.  6 
incentives.  Our model identifies two key factors necessary for the resource curse 
hypothesis to hold: the absence of effective political competition and a set of specific 
technological production relationships in both the resource and the non-resource sectors.  
The model thus links the resource curse to the degree of democracy or authoritarianism in 
the economy.      
We test our theoretical conjectures using data from Sachs and Warner’s (1997) 
seminal study.  Our regression estimates provide considerable support for the main 
predictions emerging from the theoretical analysis.  First, the empirical evidence suggests 
that resources have a large, negative and significant effect on growth in highly autocratic 
countries, but that the effect of resources on growth in democratic regimes is either 
statistically insignificant, small and negative, or significant and positive, depending upon 
the measure of democracy that is used.  Secondly, we find that the main effect of resource 
abundance on growth occurs through interaction with political variables.  The results are 
robust to alternative specifications of the growth equation and measures of democracy. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarizes earlier 
work on the resource curse and places the current contribution within the rapidly expanding 
literature.  Section 3 outlines the structure of the model and summarizes certain properties 
of the equilibrium.  Section 4 presents the main predictions.  Section 5 specifies the 
empirical model and discusses the data and results, while Section 6 concludes.  Appendix 1 
provides proofs and Appendix 2 examines the robustness of the empirical results. 
 
2. Background: Explanations of the resource curse  
Why might resource-rich countries grow slower than resource-poor ones?  Early studies on 
the resource curse placed emphasis on declining terms of trade for primary products, and 
on the failure of resource-abundant countries to develop a competitive manufacturing  7 
sector – the so-called Dutch Disease hypothesis.  A resource boom results in an 
appreciation of the exchange rate followed by a contraction of the tradable manufacturing 
sector.  In a related vein, Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) show how the tradable 
manufacturing sector might suffer from lack of investments because of the interplay 
between volatile resource returns and endogenous interest rates in imperfect capital 
markets.  A booming resource sector might also crowd out public and private investments 
in education or human capital (Gylfason 2001), or discourage entrepreneurship (Sachs and 
Warner 2001).  Thus a country’s ability to compete on world markets is eroded, reducing 
the potential for export-led growth in the long run.  These effects are re-enforced if the 
manufacturing sector is assumed to be the economy’s main ‘engine of growth’ in the long 
run; manufacturing is often associated with positive externalities and increasing returns to 
scale (e.g., Matsuyama 1992; Sachs and Warner 1999; Torvik 2001).   
Recent work by Leite and Weidmann (1999) casts doubt upon the validity of the 
Dutch disease story and related explanations.  When controlling for the level of corruption, 
Leite and Weidmann find that variables representing the export shares of fuels and ores 
(arguably the types of resources many analysts have in mind when thinking about the 
resource curse) are no longer significant in growth regressions.
2  The resource curse 
appears to vanish when the resource variable is disaggregated into its components.  But this 
conclusion could be premature as Leite and Weidmann also show that resource wealth 
tends to stimulate corruption, and that corruption in turn negatively impacts on economic 
growth.  Hence, the curse may still hold for fuel and ores, but the effect may be indirect, 
through the level of corruption. 
An alternative stream of literature explores these corruption and political economy 
aspects, focusing on the rent seeking consequences of resource booms.  It is generally 
                                                 
2 Leite and Weidmann break up the natural resources variable into 4 components; fuels, ores, agriculture and 
food.  While the variables for ores and fuels are not significant in the growth regression, the variable 
representing food export shares is significant and of the correct sign for the resource curse story.  8 
assumed that resource rents are easily appropriable by an established elite, triggering bribes 
and distorted policies.
 3  Using a simple and incisive model, Torvik (2002) shows that 
resource abundance increases the payoffs from unproductive rent seeking behaviour and 
thus lowers overall growth of the economy.
4 
Most of these models suggest a deterministic relation between resource 
endowments and economic performance.  But there appears to be not much that is 
deterministic about these links.  An overview of different case studies in Auty (2001a) 
demonstrates how complex and diverse the experiences of different countries are.  Notable 
exceptions to the resource curse hypothesis are found in both the developed and developing 
world, and include countries like Malaysia, Australia, Norway, Botswana and Canada.   
Unlike countries like Nigeria, Mexico and Venezuela, who appear to have squandered their 
oil windfalls, these countries have used their resources judiciously to build modern and 
successful economies.  These examples make clear that generalisations may at times be 
hazardous: there appears to be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ resource curse story.
5  A satisfactory 
explanation of the resource curse hypothesis must explain why resource abundance retards 
growth in some countries and promotes development in others (also see Mehlum et al. 
2002, Robinson et al. 2002). 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the deleterious impact of corruption on growth through the effect on (foreign) 
investment, the productivity of public investment and level of maintenance expenditures, the level of 
education and health expenditures and tax revenues, see Tanzi (1998) and Leite and Weidmann (1999). For a 
model where a fixed number of rent seekers competes for capital by demanding re-distributive transfers 
(effectively treating the fiscal system as a common pool), eroding profitability and investments in the 
comparative productive formal sector of the economy, see Tornell and Lane (1999). 
4 In the model, rent seekers compete for a share of the public sector’s income that is acquired through 
resource sales and fixed-rate taxation of manufacturing. Individuals compare income from production (with 
increasing returns to scale) to income from rent seeking, and arbitrage away differentials between these 
occupations by entry and exit decisions.  A resource boom tilts the balance in favour of rent seeking.  As 
entrepreneurs switch from modern manufacturing, income and demand fall, as do profits for remaining 
entrepreneurs and existing rent seekers.  Production in manufacturing falls more than the increase in natural 
resource income, a result driven by the assumption of IRS in manufacturing.  Society as a whole is worse off. 
5 This suggests that future empirical work might usefully employ specifications with flexible random 
coefficients (allowing for cross country heterogeneity).  See, for example, Koop and Tole (1999) who used 
this approach to unmask the ‘one-size-fits-all’ hypothesis for the environmental Kuznets curve (linking 
environmental pressure to income)  9 
There are two different sub-streams of the rent seeking literature that attempt to 
explain these diverging patterns of development in different countries.  First, there exists a 
class of models analysing rent seeking, entrepreneurship and multiple equilibria.  For 
example, Acemoglu (1995) and Baland and Francois (2000) demonstrate that multiple 
equilibria of unequal social desirability might materialise in a model where an endogenous 
number of rent seekers interacts with an endogenous number of entrepreneurs.
6  Baland and 
Francois’ model is useful for interpreting the divergent effects of resource booms on 
economic growth.  Depending on whether the economy is initially located in a favourable 
or unfavourable equilibrium (with few and many rent seekers, respectively), increasing the 
value of the domestic resource stock might increase or decrease aggregate income.   
Mehlum et al. (2002) develop a similar argument by adding institutions to the analysis.  
Building on the ‘big push model’ of Murphy et al. (1989), they assume that returns to 
entrepreneurial activities and rent seeking are determined by the institutional context.  In 
so-called ‘grabber-friendly’ economies, resource booms trigger a move of labor from 
production to rent seeking at the detriment of aggregate growth—the curse materializes.  In 
countries with good institutions (‘producer-friendly economies’), instead, a resource boom 
boosts production.  There is no true policy maker in these ‘a-political models,’ although 
rents are created by some exogenously set policy and rent seekers may interact with some 
exogenous entity to secure a share of these rents.  The fact that there is no government to 
steer the development process, combined with the lack of foresight or true interaction 
between decentralized agents, implies that long-run outcomes are fully determined by 
initial conditions.  Despite the fact that there are multiple equilibria for society to end up, 
such models therefore have a rather deterministic flavour. 
                                                 
6 In Acemoglu’s model rent seekers prey on the income from entrepreneurs, such that an increase in the 
number of rent seekers lowers returns to both activities.  In contrast, Baland and Francois assume that 
entrepreneurs might undermine the returns to rent seeking (as domestic production might render rents from 
import quota increasingly valueless).  10
The second explanation for the diverse effects of resource endowments on 
economic growth focuses on the insight that failure to appropriately manage resource rents 
ultimately owes to bad policy choices.  That is; this explanation focuses on policy making 
explicitly. Auty (2001a,b) distinguishes between different development trajectories, and 
argues that resource-rich countries (especially those characterized by so-called ‘point 
resources’ like oil fields) tend to be dominated by factional and predatory oligarchic 
policies, promoting narrow sectional interests.  The resource curse occurs because 
resource-rich countries are more likely to have ‘bad policies’—policies postponing the 
transition to competitive industrialisation and diversification of the economy.  As a result, 
the resource sector supports a burgeoning non-tradable sector made up of infant industries 
and an inflated but unproductive public sector.  While this line of argument contains many 
interesting observations, regularities and assertions, formal modelling appears to have 
lagged behind discursive and statistical analyses.  The only exception we are aware of is a 
political model by Robinson et al. (2002), where the focus is on an incumbent politician 
who receives all resource rents and who might distort the allocation of labor between the 
private and public sector to generate political support and retain office.   
In this paper we combine elements from these different approach and develop a 
model that combines rent seeking firms with a corrupt and strategically acting government.  
We do not develop a growth model per se, but analyse the allocation of supporting 
government policies over competing groups in society (which in turn will affect growth).  
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), policies are exchanged for bribes.  Because the 
incentive to bribe is determined by the stock of resources, the institutional context, at least 
when proxied by the level of corruption, is endogenous in our model.  Resource wealth 
might slow down economic growth because it sets the stage for a situation where policy 
makers are bribed more intensively to provide a socially sub-optimal set of public goods.   11
But there is nothing deterministic about this outcome.  Our theory predicts that, in 
autocratic regimes, resource endowments allow governments to extract greater surplus 
(bribes) by pursuing policies that are detrimental to growth.  However, the desire to retain 
power implies that these incentives are greatly attenuated when the regime faces strong 
political opposition.  Thus, in democratic regimes, the surpluses available from resource 
endowments are more likely to be used in ways that promote welfare and growth. 
 
3. The model 
Consider a small open economy with two productive sectors: natural resources (R) and 
manufacturing (M).  In the short run there are a given number of producers denoted N
M and 
N
R in each sector, which further sets this model apart from the earlier rent seeking literature 
where income gains between sectors are arbitraged away by entry and exit decisions of 
firms.  Prices of both goods are determined in the world market and exogenous in the 
model.  Inputs in production include labour (assumed perfectly mobile across sectors), 
sector-specific private capital (in case of the resource sector, this capital stock represents 
the in situ resource endowment or stock) and a sector-specific input in the form of a semi-
public good, provided by the government.  The government is assumed to be self-interested 
and maximizes its own utility, and producers can influence the supply of public inputs by 
paying political contributions or bribes to the government.  But there are limits to the 
ability of the government to pursue its own limited interests as it must worry about losing 
office as well—there is a rival that threatens to take the government’s place if its policies 
are too different from the public’s interests.
7  Regardless of the form of government, the 
incumbent rulers face a trade-off between distorting policies for personal gain and 
tempering the distortions when faced with the credible threat of losing power. 
                                                 
7  We define this constraint more precisely in the following section.  12
  The model is based on the following sequence of events.  Each production sector 
(M and R) forms itself into a lobby group that pays bribes or political contributions to the 
government.  Stage 1, defines the political interaction between the incumbent government 
and the lobby groups and is analogous to the game described in Grossman and Helpman 
(1994).  Specifically, each lobby group simultaneously offers the incumbent government a 
political contribution schedule.  A lobby’s strategy consists of a continuous function that 
maps every policy vector that the government might choose into a specific political 
contribution or bribe.  Given knowledge of the lobby groups’ strategies (i.e. contribution 
schedules), the government proceeds to set its optimal policies in Stage 2.
8 Observing this, 
in stage 3 a rival announces the policies it will implement if it could secure power in the 
following stage.  The party that wins the political contest implements the announced 
policies.  Once policies have been set, production occurs.
9   
When the government retains power the equilibrium of the game has the properties 
of the well-known common agency problem, where several participants (lobbyists) seek to 
influence the actions of a common agent (the government).  The equilibrium in this case is 
defined by: (i) a set of contribution schedules that maximises the payoffs of each lobby 
group, taking as given the rival lobby group’s schedule and the anticipated optimisation of 
the government; and (ii) a set of policies that maximises the government’s payoffs, taking 
the contribution schedules into account.  For a detailed proof see Bernheim and Whinston 
(1986, Lemma 2) and Grossman and Helpman (1994, Proposition 1). 
3.1 Firms 
                                                 
8  As outlined below, we focus on equilibria where the incumbent exploits his first mover advantage and is 
able to retain power.  Firms know this, and offer bribes in the first stage. 
9 We have assumed that the lobbies do not contribute to any challenger.  Although we recognise that this is a 
simplification, the available evidence from the US provides reasonable support for this assumption.  For 
instance, Magelby and Nelson (1990, p 56) report that PACs gave more than 80% of their contributions to 
incumbents. They conclude that contributions are given to influence policies of incumbents, rather than for 
electoral purposes.  While similar evidence from non-democratic regimes is unavailable, it seems likely that 
in these countries too contributions will be paid mainly to incumbents since support for the opposition is 
typically either deemed subversive or illegal.  Furthermore in highly unstable regimes the identity of the 
challenger may not be known in advance.   13
The production function of firms in sector x = M, R is: 





x),  fi > 0, fii< (≥ )0, fij > 0 (i,j = L
x, K
x, B
x and i≠ j).  
Goods are produced using labour L
x, capital K
x and a publicly supplied input B
x (x = R, M). 
For manufacturing, B
M, public investments possibly represent investments in human capital 
or sector-specific technologies.  For resource extraction, B
R, public investments may 
represent investments in infrastructure to ‘open up’ isolated areas, etc.—see Repetto and 
Gillis (1988) for an overview of government policies to support the logging industry.   
Factor K
M represents manmade capital (broadly defined) and K
R represents factors like 
mineral deposits, land, and soil quality.  Note that the specification in (1a) is sufficiently 
general to allow for decreasing returns in all factors in extraction, and increasing returns to 
all factors in manufacturing as postulated by Matsuyama (1992). The fixed labour 
endowment in the economy is allocated between the two sectors:    





Given the static nature of the analysis that follows, we assume the endowment of capital in 
each sector is fixed and equal to N
x x K .  Capital may either be used for production in its 
predetermined sector or allocated to some alternative use at an exogenous rate of return r
x 
(possibly equal to zero if there are no alternative uses for capital).  Aggregate profits in 
sector x = R,M are then given by:  
(2)   (( , , ) ( ) )
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where w is the wage rate, N = N
R+N
M is the total number of capital (firm) owners, T is the 
aggregate lump sum tax burden which is shared equally amongst all agents (capital owners 
and labourers) in the economy.  Finally, S
x are the bribes or contributions paid by each firm 
in each sector to influence the government’s policies on the provision of the publicly 
supplied input to its sector B
x.  The first order conditions for the choice of inputs are:  14
(3a)   0 x
xx
L Pf w −= , and 
(3b)   0 x
xx
K Pf r −= . 
Equations (3a) and (3b) yield factor demand equations L
x*(w,r,P
x,B
x) for each firm in each 
sector, which together with the full employment condition in (1b) determines the wage rate.  

























 > 0 (x,y = R,M; x ≠ y). 
where (*) denotes equilibrium values of variables.  Having defined equilibrium wages and 
input choices, we now consider how political contributions are determined.
10 The 
government is assumed to be self interested and cares about the bribes or political 
contributions that it receives from producers. Alternatively, and without loss, we may 
consider the case where the government maximizes a linear function with exogenous 
weights given to both contributions and welfare (see Grossman and Helpman 1994).
11  
Knowing this, producers have an incentive to influence the government’s policies by 
paying bribes. Each sector is assumed to form itself into a lobby group that offers the 
government a bribe.  The producer lobby groups simultaneously choose their political 
contributions S
x to maximise profits, taking account of the impact of their choices on the 
equilibrium wage rate and the government’s response.  The representative producer in 
                                                 
10  To facilitate the exposition  we deal with all firm, worker and government decisions separately, taking 
account of functional dependencies, where appropriate.  Hence for example, since the firm sets contributions 
first, this implies that it takes account of the government’s reaction function.  We allow for this dependence in 
the optimising decisions of the firm in equation (4a) (i.e. the term ∂ B
x/∂ S
x).  
11  However in our model the relative weight that is eventually given to welfare is shown to depend on the 
intensity of political competition.  Thus we take a small step towards endogenising the relative weights in the 
Grossman-Helpman (1994) formulation of the government objective function.  15
sector  x = M,R chooses S to maximise profits: Π
x (( , , )
xx x x x P fL KB =  
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.  The associated first order condition is: 
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From (4a): lobbying will only occur if further provision of the publicly supplied input is 
profitable to the producer.
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).  Thus, as 
noted by Grossman and Helpman (1994), the political contribution schedule is locally 
truthful.  As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), this concept can be extended to a 
contribution schedule that is globally truthful.  This yields a function which accurately 
mirrors the preferences of the lobbyist's at all policy points.   
  Finally, totally differentiating (4a) and rearranging, it can be verified that: 
                                                 
12  With a potentially large number of agents in the economy the possible increase in the individual’s tax 
burden arising from a rise in B
x is assumed to be negligible. Producers ignore the impact of their lobbying on 
their tax burden. Relaxing this assumption complicates the analysis but does not alter the main conclusions.  16















Thus rivalry in lobbying implies that contributions are strategic substitutes.  Intuitively, an 
increase in political contributions, S
M, induces a greater supply of the public good B
M, so 
that output in sector M expands and equilibrium wages rise.  Ceteris paribus, higher wages 
reduce the profitability of production in sector R.  Since political donations are truthful and 
reflect the payoffs from a policy change (eq. 4b), contributions from sector R decline. From 
equation (4a) it follows that the equilibrium contribution schedules of each lobby group is: 
(4d)  
* (, * (,,,) , )
x x xx xyxy x N S SBw BBPP r N =  (x, y = M,R and x ≠  y). 
3.2 Workers Utility 
Workers obtain utility from consumption of the manufacturing sector’s output and a pure 
public good B
z.  The representative worker’s utility function is: 
(5)   ( )
wM z Uxu B =+ , 
where u(B
Z) is the sub-utility function with u’> 0 and u” < 0.  Utility is maximised subject 
to the budget constraint specifying that the sum of consumption expenditures and tax 
payments equal wage income: 
  wL = P
Mx
M + T/(N+L). 
Thus, demand for good M is equal to wL/P
M – T/[(N+L)P
M], and consumer’s surplus from 
consumption of good M must equal wL[1 – LT/(L+N)][(1 - P
M)/P
M]. 
3.3 The Government 
The incumbent government cares only about the payoffs from retaining power: 
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13  To see why note that by the second order conditions 
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ii i i j CCC ><=), and H is the intrinsic utility, if any, arising from holding office.  
The sum of bribes and fiscal surplus represents discretionary funds that can be used for any 
purposes – personal or political – that the government chooses.  These funds could be used 
to deter political rivals, suppress opposition, fund election campaigns, or simply embezzled 
for personal consumption.   Without loss we assume that when the government looses 
office its utility is normalised to zero. 
3.4 The challenger 
Incumbent leaders seldom govern without the potential threat of being challenged.  The 
survival of a government is threatened when it is no longer able to garner sufficient 
resources either to sustain political support through its policies, or subdue political 
opposition.  Thus to retain office, incumbents must be attentive to the pressures they face 
from opponents.
14  Let ( , , , )
MRz B BBT  be the set of policies proposed by the government, 
and let W( , , , )
MRz B BBT  be the resulting aggregate level of welfare of the three types of 
agents in the economy.  Total welfare is simply defined as the sum of industry profits after 
paying taxes and bribes in sector’s M and R and the utility of workers (which consists of 
consumer’s surplus from the consumption of goods M and B
Z.)
15  
 W( , , , )
MRz B BBT  = 
1
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+
. 
It is assumed that a single challenger who, having observed the government’s policies, 
announces the policy vector (,,)
MRz B BB. Let the corresponding aggregate welfare level 
                                                 
14  For a more detailed justification of this argument, see Mesquita et al (2003). 
15 Following much of the common agency literature we assume that the number and hence consumption of 
capital owners is assumed to be trivially small so that their consumer’s surplus is ignored.  18
be  (,, , )
MRz WB B B T.  We adopt two crucial assumptions about the political process.  First, 
it is assumed that the transition of power from the incumbent to the challenger is more 
likely to occur if such a transition gains greater public support.  We interpret this as 
follows; a transition is more likely to occur (that is; be supported) if it raises aggregate 
welfare—since people care about welfare.  Alternative interpretations are feasible, but 
these are left for future research.  In the context of democratic societies, the above 
interpretation is perhaps obvious as raising aggregate welfare offers scope to make the 
median voter better off.
16  In the context of non-democratic societies, however, it is also 
true that popular support raises the odds of a successful coupe d’état, and increasing 
welfare could provide the means to ensure popular support.
17 
Second, we assume that political transitions are not without costs.  In non-
democratic regimes the transition of power usually takes the form of revolutions and 
violent political struggles that disrupt economic activity and impose substantial costs on 
citizens. By contrast, in democracies the electoral process provides a (relatively) low cost 
and orderly opportunity for the transfer of power.  The transition of power in a non-
democratic regime imposes higher economic costs than in a democracy.  It is assumed that 
the greater are the discretionary resources available to the incumbent, the greater will be its 
ability to resist a regime change.  This is likely since discretionary funds can be used to 
deter or suppress opposition either by force, or through persuasive propaganda.
18   This 
                                                 
16 A necessary condition for the results in our model to go through with median voting is to assume that the 
number of players in the resource sector is small relative to other agents in the model, so that the median 
voter is from the non-resource sector. 
17  Sutter (2000) provides an analytical study of the determinants of rebellion.  For a survey of related issues 
see Hardin (1997) and Tullock (1978). 
18  See Grossman and Helpman (1996) for a model of political advertising.  More importantly it is worth 
noting that the notion that costs of transition are higher in (i) autocratic regimes and (ii) where the 
government has greater resources at its disposal is not new in the political science literature.  Some political 
economy studies have also explored this issue.  For instance, Wintrobe (1978) discusses how autocrats use 
resources for repression and internal security in order to increase the costs of regime change and hence quell 
opposition.  Tullock’s (1978) review of autocracies provides further support.   19





+ D) denote the welfare costs of a change in regime.  We assume that v’>0 and v”=0.
19  
From these two assumptions it follows that a change in regime will be welfare 
improving (and will thus occur) if the following holds: 
(7)        W( , , , )
MRz B BBT  <  (,, , )





We adopt the convention that when (7) holds as an equality, the incumbent retains power. 
To determine when (7) is satisfied it is necessary to first derive the opposition’s optimal 
policy vector. To do so define the welfare maximising set of policies as: 
(,,, )
WM W R W z W W B BBT Λ=  with corresponding welfare maximising level of welfare 
W
W(Λ
W).  Given any set of policies of the incumbent ( , , , )
MRz B BBT  with associated 
welfare level W(,,, )
MRz B BBT , the rival can secure power by proposing a set of policies 
that yields aggregate utility level: 
(8)      W( , , , )




R +D) + ε 1  () W ≡Λ , 
for all ε 1 > 0.  Condition (8) implies that the benefits of a regime change exceed the costs of 
the transition and there will be a change in government.  
Knowing this, in stage 1 the incumbent will seek to retain power by setting policies 
that yield welfare of  2 () W ε Λ+ , where ε 2  > 0.  Ultimately, the incumbent as first mover 
knows that for any given policy vector Λ
i that it sets, the rival can seize power by offering 
policies that yield utility  ()
i
i Wv ε Λ++  (ε i > 0).  So long as such policies exist, there will 
be a regime change.  To retain power, the incumbent must set policies such that a regime 
change does not confer a net welfare gain.  Intuitively, “Bertrand” type of competition in 
policies implies that the incumbent can only retain power if the opposition is required to 
                                                 
19  We present results for the simpler case of linear costs, but the results are also consistent with convex costs.  20
offer policies that yield greater net utility than is available at the welfare maximising set of 
policies: 
 (9)      W( , , , )




R +D)   ( )
WW W ≥Λ . 
Observe that as v rises the government has more freedom to set policies that deviate from 
the welfare maximising ideal ( ( )
WW W ≥Λ ) – costly transitions generate slack that the 
incumbent can exploit to his own benefit.  In oppressive regimes with no effective 
opposition equation (9) will hold as a strict inequality. In countries with high levels of 
political competition (9) will hold as an equality.  To retain office the incumbent must 
propose policies to maximise (6), subject to: 
 (i)  W( , , , )
MRz B BBT  ≥   (,, , )






 (ii)  (,, , ) ()
MRz WW WB B B T W =Λ .   
The necessary (Kuhn Tucker) conditions of the government’s problem in (5b) are: 
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where L is the Langrangean and λ 1  is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (i).  In the 
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20 It may be more reasonable to state this constraint in terms of probabilities. That is; the probability of 
retaining power is Pr = Pr (Φ ) where Φ  =(W(,,, )
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 when constraint (i) binds, and  1*0 λ =  when (i) is slack. 
It is instructive to compare the policy outcomes under political competition (i.e. a 
binding constraint), with the policies that obtain in the absence of political competition.  
Accordingly, let B
xc be the equilibrium supply of the public good when the constraint binds 
(i.e. under intense political competition) and let B
xa be the equilibrium supply of the public 
good when the constraint does not bind. 
Lemma 1. If increased provision of the public good B
x to sector x (x = M, R) lowers 
the aggregate welfare of other agents in the economy, then the amount of B
x supplied 
under political competition (B
xc) will be lower than the amount supplied in the 
absence of political competition (B
xa). 
 (i.e. B














  < (>) 0) 
Intuitively equations (11a) and (11b) suggest that the government determines the supply of 
public goods to each sector by comparing the politically relevant marginal benefits and 
marginal costs.  In the absence of political competition the constraint does not bind, so that 











. This implies 
that the government supplies public goods to each sector up to the point where the marginal  22
benefits in the form of increased political contributions equal the marginal cost of public 
good provision.  However, political competition forces the government to take account of 
the welfare effects of its policy on other agents.  Moreover, the weight given to these 
welfare effects is declining in v’ – the marginal cost of regime change.  It follows that if 
greater provision of a public good to sector x = M,R, generates a net welfare loss upon 













 < 0) an incumbent who wishes to 
retain power is compelled to lower supply of the public good to that sector and vice-versa.  
In short, political competition is the channel through which the influence of special interest 
lobby groups can be attenuated.  But as the costs of political change (v) rise, the potentially 
beneficial impact of political competition diminishes.  Thus governments act rationally.  
They extract greater surplus through policy distortions when secure, and retract towards the 
welfare maximising equilibrium when challenged by an opponent. 
There are a number of ways to analyse the effect of resource endowments on 
economic growth.  The key feature we are interested in concerns the effect of resource 
abundance on the setting of policies in political equilibrium.  One straightforward approach 
would be to link provision of public goods B
M and B
R to the size of the resource stock K
R.  
However, we have chosen a slightly different avenue that allows us to leave the production 
functions unspecified.  Consistent with the ‘resource boom’ analysis of Baland and 
Francois (2000), we model a resource boom as an exogenous increase in the price of good 
P











R, the analytical results with respect to the size of the (exogenous) resource stock 
are similar to the results with respect to the resource price.  Therefore, while strictly 
analysing the impact of relative prices on policies and growth, the results spill over to the 
case of resource endowments and growth for most common production functions. 
  23
4. Results 
In analysing the effect of a resource boom on policies, as set-up in problem (10), we 
consider two cases.  First, it is assumed that the government faces no potential challenger.  
Second, it is assumed that the government knows that there is a challenger waiting to take 









−  > 0, so that provision of the public good to each sector always 
raises the marginal payoffs to that sector from increased production. The main result of the 
former case is in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. In the absence of an immediate political challenger, a resource boom 
induces greater provision of public goods to sector R and less to the manufacturing 
sector.  Thus manufacturing output declines while resource sector output rises:   
dB
m/dP
R < 0, dB
R/dP
R > 0 and dB
z/dP
R = 0. 
Proof: see appendix 1. 
The interpretation is as follows.  A resource boom, modelled either as a rise in the resource 
price or an increase in the resource stock (in case of a multiplicative production function), 
induces a transfer of support to the resource sector, at the expense of policies supporting 
the manufacturing sector.  The manufacturing sector, which might be economically more 
attractive because of network effects or spillover benefits (see Matsuyama 1992; the 
specification of production is sufficiently general to allow for this case), gets squeezed.
21  
In other words, policies are steered away from their most productive use (at the margin) 
which will lower growth relative to the first-best benchmark.  The reason why this happens 
                                                 
21 The resource curse is a consequence of the sub-optimal allocation of public goods to the non-resource 
sector, which lowers economy wide growth rates.  Our results also apply to cases where manufacturing is 
assumed to be the “engine of growth” because of spill-over external benefits (e.g. Matsuyama 1992).  This 
would simply strengthen our conclusions.  Note from (4b) that each producer pays bribes up to the point 
where the individual’s marginal gain from lobbying equals the marginal cost -- the external spill-over benefits 
from manufacturing are ignored.  A government receptive to lobbying will place a lower weight on the spill-
over benefits of manufacturing, resulting in greater policy distortions in the absence of political competition.  24
is that the ‘boom’ raises the value of government support for the resource sector at the 
margin, and therefore raises the level of bribes offered to the incumbent.
22  In response, 
sectoral policies will favour the resource industry, at the expense of the other one.   
In the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model where the incumbent cares about both 
bribes and welfare (‘balanced’ with a fixed weight in the government’s objective function) 
a resource boom and the associated bribe response will lead the economy (further) away 
from the welfare maximising path.  The resource boom distorts policies and lowers 
aggregate welfare – the resource curse always materialises in this case.  But this result need 
not always hold in this model, as is evident from proposition 2 that summarises the main 
result for the case when there exists political opposition. 
Proposition 2. When the political constraint binds the effects of a resource boom are 
ambiguous. The provision of public goods to sector M increases and sector R declines 
if the costs of greater support for the non-resource sector are not too high.  
(dB
R /dP
R < 0 and dB
M /dP













+Π > − % )  
Proof: see Appendix 1. 
In other words, excessive (inefficient) levels of support for sector R may not be 
forthcoming if there is a political constraint that effectively forces the government to 
support the other sectors.  The challenger disciplines the incumbent, forcing it to keep 
welfare in mind when setting policies for fear of being ousted.  In effect, the incumbent 
trades off the prospect of retaining office against the immediate temptation of “bad 
policies” and the riches brought by them. 
  The economic explanation for the subtle result in the presence of political 
opposition is as follows.  An increase in policies supporting the resource sector, B
R, induces 
                                                 
22 In a related but different vein, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) have established that thicker resource stocks are 
associated with strife and social war.  While formal war is ruled out in the model above, we do note that 
thicker stocks are consistent with more lobby effort for scarce resources and therefore more competition.  25
an increase in employment in sector R and bids up wages.  This negatively affects sector M, 
and this sector’s fall in profits translates into a reduction in bribes that it is willing to pay to 
the government.  This, in turn, implies that the manufacturing sector looses its political 
influence and its level of support received from the government.  At first sight this result 
appears consistent with the Dutch disease explanation—a resource booms bids up wages at 
the expense of the manufacturing sector’s competitiveness.  But the underlying process is 
different – politically driven policy responses lead to distortionary policies being adopted. 
The resource curse emerges when the incumbent can effectively suppress all 
credible opposition to its policies (proposition 1).  In addition, the resource curse might 
emerge in the presence of political opposition, but only under specific conditions 
(proposition 2).  Indeed, the opposite result can also occur.  A resource boom might induce 
policy improvements.  The intuition for this result is the following.  Recall that the 
incumbent can increase its hold on power by either raising the costs of regime change, or 
adopting policies that are closer to the welfare maximising ideal. When there is a resource 
boom the government faces a trade-off.  It can use the extra resources to increase the costs 
of regime change by garnering further contributions from the resource sector, or it can 
adopt policies that improve general welfare.  Proposition 2 summarises the natural 
condition that when the relative costs of adopting welfare improving policies are not too 
high, then a resource boom when accompanied by strong political opposition induces a 
transfer of support from sector R to sector M.  
 
5. Empirical evidence 
Ultimately the validity of our theoretical conjectures must depend upon the empirical 
evidence. In this section we therefore provide a direct test of the theory. However, it is 
useful to begin with a brief survey of some existing evidence on key predictions of the  26
model.  First, given the appropriate context, we argue that thicker resource stocks will 
translate into more corruption.  This is consistent with results reported by Leite and 
Weidmann (1999).  Second, we show that more corruption implies a lower level of 
provision of (semi) public goods that do not directly favour the resource sector.  This is 
confirmed by Deacon (2003).  Finally, we note that the extent of corruption distorts the set 
of policies chosen by the government, which lowers growth.  This is consistent with a 
variety of studies, including Leite and Weidmann (1999). 
  Our theory predicts that resource endowments allow governments to pursue policies 
that are detrimental to growth in autocratic regimes, but that the effect will be mitigated or 
even reversed in democratic systems.  We proceed by directly testing these predictions by 
including measures of the degree of democracy or autocracy using the regression equations 
and data of Sachs and Warner (1997).   
Finding appropriate measures of democracy and autocracy at the cross-national 
level is difficult.  In the political science literature democracy (autocracy) is usually defined 
in terms of political and institutional attributes of a regime.  This is reflected in the two 
main measures of democracy that are available: the Polity data of Marshall and Jaggers 
(2003) and Vanhanen’s (2000) Polyarchy index.
23 For our purposes the most suitable 
measure is provided by the Polity data of Marshall and Jaggers (2003).  Marshall and 
Jaggers provide separate measures of the democratic and autocratic attributes of each 
country.  This therefore allows us to directly test for possible differences in the impact of 
resources across democratic and autocratic characteristics.  Democracy is measured by an 
additive ten-point scale, with a score of ten being given to the most democratic system and 
zero to the least democratic.  The democracy attributes include: the competitiveness of 
political participation, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of 
                                                 
23  Freedom House also provide a proxy for democracy.  However, their index is a subjective measure of civic 
and political freedoms which, it is argued, are related to the level of democracy.  For the measures required in 
this study the Freedom House index seems to be the least appropriate measure.  27
executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.  The autocratic attributes are 
also measured on a ten-point scale, with a score of ten being given to the most autocratic.  
The autocratic attributes include proxies for: the lack of political competition, the 
regulation of political participation, lack of openness of executive recruitment and lack of 
constraints on the chief executive.    
The other main index of democracy is provided by Vanhanen (2000).  The focus of 
this index is on two specific attributes of democracy: political participation and political 
competition.  The Vanhanen index ignores counteracting autocratic elements in a regime, 
which could negate the effects of democratic institutions.
24   
Our theoretical analysis predicts that the impact of resources on policies and hence 
growth is conditional upon the type of political regime. The separate measures of autocracy 
and democracy provided in the polity data set provide a reasonable vehicle for directly 
testing these theoretical predictions and are therefore used in the empirical analysis.  As a 
robustness check we also provide results based on the Vanhanen democracy index in 
Appendix 2.  This provides even stronger empirical support for our theoretical predictions.  
Economists typically treat the degree of democracy as exogenous, even in light of 
evidence that income might affect democracy as well (Minier 1998).  Recent work by 
Durham (1999) suggests that treating political regimes in growth regressions as exogenous 
is appropriate, and that income levels rather than growth rates affect regime types.   
Following earlier work (e.g., Barro 1996), we therefore assume that the degree of 
                                                 
24 Hence there are notable differences between the Vanhanen and Polity indices.  For instance, a country such 
as Malaysia, which subscribes to the democratic process, has a high level of voter participation and political 
competition. It therefore scores relatively well on the Vanhanen democracy index. However, the authoritarian 
elements of the regime (such as lack of openness of executive recruitment and lack of constraints on the chief 
executive) give it a much lower score on the Polity index.  28
democracy and authoritarianism are exogenous and include them as explanatory 
variables.
25     
In Table 1 we present regression results.  As is usual, the dependent variable is the 
average growth rate of real GDP from 1970 to 1990.  The first column replicates the Sachs 
and Warner results using their data, and features the familiar result of a statistically 
negative coefficient for the variable representing resource abundance.  The explanatory 
variables included in Sachs and Warner’s preferred specification are: initial income 
measured by the log of GDP per economically active person in 1970; a measure of the 
degree of openness of the economy; growth of the log of the terms of trade; a rule of law 
index, the log of the ratio of investment to GDP and resource abundance as measured by 
the share of primary exports in GNP. 
      The second column includes an interaction term: [autocracy]  ×  [ resource 
abundance].  The theory suggests that resources are detrimental for economic growth when 
the incumbent government does not face political competition, and therefore the interaction 
variable should have a negative sign.  This is consistent with the empirical findings in 
Table 1.  Moreover, note that resource abundance is insignificant at the 5% level after 
including the interaction variable.  This suggests that the political interaction term captures 
the main effect of resource abundance on growth. These results are robust with respect to 





                                                 
25 Further problems may arise with the use of a single equation regression if resource endowments influence 
the type of political regime that eventuates.  In the Appendix we report correlation coefficients between 
democracy measures and resource abundance.  These don’t demonstrate any statistical relationship.  29
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Equipment         19.3** 
(3.67) 
Observations  74 72  72  72 72 
Adjusted R
2  0.736  0.769  0.767  0.762 0.765 
*=significant at 5% level, **=significant at 1% level 
 
As a first robustness check we include in regressions 3 and 4, respectively, variables 
measuring the degree of democracy and autocracy.  Regression 3 reveals that the resource 
term when interacted with democracy, is statistically insignificant at the 5% level, with a 
markedly smaller coefficient than the interaction of resources with autocracy. In regression 
4, democracy is included as an explanatory variable and has an insignificant impact on 
growth.  We have run various model specifications with different explanatory variables 
(such as those included by Barro 1991, King and Levine 1993 and others) and consistently 
find the interaction of resources with autocracy is large, negative and significant, but that 
democracy has a negative effect on growth and autocracy has a positive effect on growth 
(albeit these are not always significant).  The latter finding is intriguing and perhaps  30
disappointing, but it is not uncommon in the literature (for an overview of early studies, see 
Przeworski and Limongi 1993; for more recent work, see for example Barro 1996, Minier 
1998, Durham 1999).  The literature provides a number of reasons why democracy can be 
bad for economic growth, but there is no clear consensus on this issue yet.
26  Przeworski 
and Limongi suggest that democracies can be beneficial for growth because democratic 
institutions constrain “predatory” tendencies of the ruling class, which might harm 
investment and growth.  The theory and empirical results in this paper suggest a link 
between such predatory behavior and resource abundance.  Finally, in column 5 we use 
investment spending on equipment as a fraction of GDP as an explanatory variable instead 
of the Sachs-Warner measure of investment.  A number of the Sachs-Warner explanatory 
variables turn insignificant at the 5% level, as does the interaction between resource 
abundance  and  democracy.  However, the interaction of resource abundance with 
autocracy  remains highly significant and negative.  This general finding appears to be 
robust and holds in various other empirical growth models that were tested. 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
We develop a model that combines the rent seeking and lobbying efforts of firms with the 
strategic behaviour of a corrupt government, and discuss the conditions under which the 
well-known ‘resource curse’ result obtains.  By combining both firm and government 
incentives the model extends earlier work.  The focus on lobbying and bribing is 
appropriate in light of recent empirical findings that suggest that the main effect of 
                                                 
26 For example, Persson and Tabellini (1992) highlight the growth-retarding effect of redistributive taxation in 
democracies, and Przeworski and Limongi (1993) argue that investment may be facilitated by unpopular 
“strong measures” implemented with an “iron hand”—not necessarily the policies chosen by democratic 
leaders who fret about re-election. There is also anecdotal support that autocracy might have economic 
benefits.  For instance in a recent review of the Malaysian economy the Economist (5 April 2003, p11) notes 
that “There are some advantages to democratic dictatorship as practiced in Malaysia. If necessary, a 
government can take action with a degree of dispatch that leaves more pluralistic systems for dead.”   31
resources on economic growth is through the level of corruption that distorts policies (see 
Leite and Weidmann 1999).  
In our model, the curse may materialise because resource firms successfully lobby 
for semi-public goods that increase production in their sector. In the absence of political 
competition, governments are more receptive to special interest lobbying.  Thus, during a 
resource boom (interpreted as either new resource discoveries or sudden price hike) 
lobbying increases in intensity. The government is ‘seduced’ to stray away from the 
welfare maximising path and provides excessive support to the resource sector at the 
expense of the manufacturing sector.  This lowers manufacturing output and, depending on 
the exact specification of production, lowers aggregate welfare and economic growth.       
But resource booms are not always bad for growth – see Mehlum et al (2002).  Whether it 
is feasible to purchase policies that trigger a “resource curse” is determined by the presence 
or absence of political competition, and the associated costs implied by a regime change.  
The empirical evidence that we present appears to be consistent with our theoretical 
predictions.   
  To summarize, the main link between resources and manufacturing in our model is 
twofold.  First, resource booms and the associated incentive to bribe the planner will bid up 
wages in manufacturing.  This is reminiscent of the Dutch disease argument, albeit due to 
distorting policies rather than market clearing responses.  Second, and enforcing the first 
effect, resource booms will lead to under-provision of the semi-public good that are 
important for manufacturing.  For example, it is commonly assumed that manufacturing 
requires the use of human capital which depends upon the provision of a semi-public good 
B
M such as  ‘education’.  Gylfason (2001) has emphasized and discussed the inverse 
statistical relation between resource abundance and ‘education.’  While Gylfason argues 
that “underrating” or “overlooking” the need for good economic policies may cause such a  32
policy response, our model suggests that resource booms might be logically and rationally 
linked to low education through rent seeking and corruption. 
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Appendix 1: Proofs of propositions 
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, which can be substituted into the remaining 
equations.  In cases where the constraint does not bind we have λ *1
  = 0 and condition (A5) 
does not form part of the necessary conditions. 
 
Assume the SOCs are satisfied (LRR < 0, LMM < 0).  Differentiating (A2), (A3) and (A5): 
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=+ Π −− %  > (<) 0, (where (A3) has been used to 
further simplify the expression) and 
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Proposition 1 
When the constraint does not bind and λ 1 = 0.  It follows that LRM < 0, LRP
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+Π > − % . 
The left hand side are the benefits in terms of increased contributions from the resource 
sector and the right hand side represents the external welfare costs on other agents   38
Appendix 2: Robustness Checks 
In this Appendix we check the robustness of our main results.  First, we investigate whether 
the qualitative predictions of the model continue to hold using Vanhanen’s alternative 
measure of democracy.  The Vanhanen index only measures (two) attributes of democracy, 
hence it is not possible to test for variations in growth across autocratic characteristics of 
regimes. Proposition 2 suggests that in more democratic systems, resource endowments are 
more likely to have a positive impact upon growth.  This suggests that the Vanhanen’s 
index of democracy could have a positive and significant effect on growth.  This is 
confirmed by the regression results below.  While resource endowments in general have a 
negative effect on growth, interacting the resource term with the democracy variable, it has 
a positive and significant effect.  The negative coefficient on the resource term may reflect 
omitted variable bias stemming from the neglect of autocratic effects: 
 
Table A1: Regression results (t-statistics in parentheses) 
  Regression 1 
Initial income level  -1.83** 
(-8.17) 
Openness  1.50** 
(3.75) 
Terms of Trade Change  0.076 
(1.57) 
Investment  0.080** 
(3.13) 
Rule of Law  0.35** 
(3.45) 
Resource abundance  -11.63** 
(-6.36) 
Resource abundance ×  Vanhanen Index of Democracy  0.29** 
(2.29) 







2  0.752 
 
 
As an alternative check of our results we divide the sample into democratic and autocratic 
countries and assess the differential effects of resource endowments across regime types.  
In Table A2 countries are classified in terms of their Marshall and Jaggers (2003) so-called 
“polity score.”  This summary measure is obtained by subtracting the autocracy score from 
the democracy score. (defined as polity score =  democratic index – autocratic index).  
Countries with a polity score from 0 to 10 are considered democratic (column 1) and those 
with a score from –1 to –10 are classified as autocratic (column 2).  We replicate the Sachs-
Warner regressions with this partition of the sample in Table 2 below:  39
 
Table A2: Regression results for democratic and autocratic regimes 
 Democratic  Autocratic  Highly  Autocratic 
Polity Score ≤  -3 
Countries with 
Polity Scores > -3 

































































In autocratic regimes (column 2) resources have a statistically significant and negative 
effect on growth, which confirms Proposition 1. In contrast, in regimes classified as 
“democratic,” this effect is statistically insignificant at even the 10% level.  This is 
consistent with Proposition 2.  Are these results sensitive to the partition used?  In column 
3 we present results for all countries with polity values ≤  -3 (“highly autocratic”).  Column 
4 summarises the outcome for all other countries with scores > -3.  The main conclusions 
are again supported by these results. 
  Finally there remains the possibility that resource endowments may influence the 
type of political system that eventuates.  For instance, it could be argued that resources 
induce extreme forms of rent seeking, which in turn lead to more autocratic forms of 
governance.  In this case, resource endowments and political regime type would be 
expected to be strongly correlated – rendering our estimates unreliable.  However, there is 
little evidence of any multicollinearity between ‘regime type’ and ‘resource abundance’.  
The correlation coefficient between resources and: (i) autocracy is 0.255; (ii) democracy is 
0.261, (iii) the polity index is 0.23, and (iv) the Vanhanen index is 0.2461.   CIES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
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